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Abstract— The wireless medium contains domain-specific in-
formation that can be used to complement and enhance tradi-
tional security mechanisms. In this paper we propose ways to
exploit the spatial variability of the radio channel response in a
rich scattering environment, as is typical of indoor environments.
Specifically, we describe a physical-layer authentication algorithm
that utilizes channel probing and hypothesis testing to determine
whether current and prior communication attempts are made
by the same transmit terminal. In this way, legitimate users
can be reliably authenticated and false users can be reliably
detected. We analyze the ability of a receiver to discriminate
between transmitters (users) according to their channel frequency
responses. This work is based on a generalized channel response
with both spatial and temporal variability, and considers correla-
tions among the time, frequency and spatial domains. Simulation
results, using the ray-tracing tool WiSE to generate the time-
averaged response, verify the efficacy of the approach under
realistic channel conditions, as well as its capability to work
under unknown channel variations.
I. INTRODUCTION
As wireless devices become increasingly pervasive and
essential, they are becoming both a target for attack and the
very weapon with which such an attack can be carried out.
Traditional high-level computer and network security tech-
niques can, and must, play an important role in combating such
attacks, but the wireless environment presents both the means
and the opportunity for new forms of intrusion. The devices
that comprise a wireless network are low-cost commodity
items that are easily available to potential intruders and also
easily modifiable for such intrusion. In particular, wireless
networks are open to intrusion from the outside without the
need for a physical connection and, as a result, techniques that
would provide a high level of security in a wired network have
proven inadequate in a wireless network, as many motivated
groups of students have readily demonstrated [1]–[3].
Although conventional cryptographic security mechanisms
are essential to securing wireless networks, these techniques
do not directly leverage the unique properties of the wireless
domain to address security threats. The physical properties of
the wireless medium are a powerful source of domain-specific
information that can be used to complement and enhance
traditional security mechanisms. In this paper, we propose
a cross-layer approach to augment the security of wireless
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networks for indoor wireless environments. In particular, we
believe that the nature of the wireless medium can be turned to
the advantage of the network engineer when trying to secure
wireless communications. The enabling factor in our approach
is that, in the rich multipath environment typical of wireless
scenarios, the response of the medium along any transmit-
receive path is frequency-selective (or in the time domain,
dispersive) in a way that is location-specific. This means:
1) The channel can be specified by a number of complex
samples either in the frequency domain (a set of complex
gains at a set of frequencies) or the time domain (a set
of impulse response samples at a set of time delays).
2) Such sets of numbers decorrelate from one transmit-
receive path to another if the paths are separated by the
order of an RF wavelength or more.
While using the physical layer to enhance security might
seem to be a radical paradigm shift for wireless systems, we
note that this is not the first time that multipath and advanced
physical layer methods have proven advantageous. Specifi-
cally, we are encouraged in our belief by two notable parallel
paradigm shifts in wireless systems: (1) code division multiple
access (CDMA) systems [4], where the use of Rake processing
transforms multipath into a diversity-enhancing benefit; and
(2) multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) antenna techniques
[5], which transform scatter-induced Rayleigh fading into a
capacity-enhancing benefit.
Note that there have been recent efforts in studying the
information and secrecy capacity [6]–[8], that can be achieved
by using the radio channel information. In contrast, this paper
studies the feasibility of using such radio channel information.
It does so by explicitly devising hypothesis testing procedures
to estimate and track the radio channel for authentication
purposes.
We begin (Section II) by reviewing some related work.
Then (Section III), we provide an overview of our proposed
PHY-layer authentication service. We next present a general
time-variant channel model (Section IV) that we will use
as the basis for our discussions in this paper. In Section
V, we describe a hypothesis testing framework for physical
layer authentication. In Section VI, we present an overview
of our simulation approach. We present our simulation results
in Section VII, and wrap up the paper in Section VIII with
concluding remarks.
II. RELATED WORK
In commodity networks, such as 802.11 networks, it is
easy for a device to alter its MAC address and claim to be
2another device by simply issuing an ifconfig command.
This weakness is a serious threat, and there are numerous
attacks, ranging from session hijacking [9] to attacks on
access control lists [2], which are facilitated by the fact that
an adversarial device may masquerade as another device.
In response, researchers have proposed using physical layer
information to enhance wireless security. For example, spectral
analysis has been used to identify the type of wireless network
interface card (NIC), and thus to discriminate among users
with different NICs [10]. A similar method, radio frequency
fingerprinting, discriminates wireless devices according to the
transient behavior of their transmitted signals [11]. For more
general networks, the clock skew characteristic of devices
has been viewed as a remote fingerprint of devices over
the Internet [12]. In addition, the inherent variability in the
construction of various digital devices has been used to detect
intrusion [13].
More recently, the wireless channel has been explored as a
new form of fingerprint for wireless security. The reciprocity
and rich multipath of the ultrawideband channel has been used
as a means to establish encryption keys [6]. In [14], a practical
scheme to discriminate between transmitters was proposed and
identifies mobile devices by tracking measurements of signal
strength from multiple access points. A similar approach was
considered for sensor networks in [15]. Concurrent to these
efforts, the present authors have built a significance test that
exploits the spatial variability of propagation to enhance the
authentication in the stationary, time-invariant channel [16]. In
this paper, we have significantly expanded the method to cover
a more generalized channel, where there are time variations
due to changes in the environment. As in [16], however, the
ends of the link remain stationary, as might be the case for a
population of users sitting in a room or airport terminal. We
will see that, in some cases, the time variations improve the
authentication.
III. PROBLEM OVERVIEW
Authentication is traditionally associated with the assurance
that a communication comes from a specific entity [17]. In
the context of physical layer authentication, however, we are
not interested in identity, per se, but rather are interested in
recognizing a particular transmitting device. The ability to
distinguish between different transmitters would not replace
traditional identity-based authentication, but would be partic-
ularly valuable as a wireless system enhancement. Such an
approach would be beneficial for scenarios where managing
cryptographic key material is difficult, and further would
reduce the load placed on higher-layer authentication buffers.
Here, we borrow from the conventional terminology of
the security community by introducing three different parties:
Alice, Bob and Eve. For our purposes, these three entities
may be thought of as wireless transmitters/receivers that are
potentially located in spatially separated positions, as depicted
in Fig. 1. Our two “legal” protagonists are the usual Alice
and Bob, and for the sake of discussion throughout this paper,
Alice will serve as the transmitter that initiates communication,
while Bob will serve as the intended receiver. Their nefarious
A
B
Scattering
Cluster1
Scattering
Cluster 2
Scattering
Cluster 3
E
Fig. 1. The adversarial multipath environment involving multiple scattering
surfaces. The transmission from Alice (A) to Bob (B) experiences different
multipath effects than the transmission by the adversary, Eve (E).
adversary, Eve, will serve as an active adversary that injects
undesirable communications into the medium in the hopes of
spoofing Alice.
Our security objective, broadly speaking, is to provide
authentication between Alice and Bob, despite the presence
of Eve. Since Eve is within range of Alice and Bob, and
capable of injecting her own signals into the environment to
impersonate Alice, Bob must have the ability to differentiate
between legitimate signals from Alice and illegitimate signals
from Eve.
Consider a simple transmitter identification protocol in
which Bob seeks to verify that Alice is the transmitter. Suppose
that Alice transmits probes into the channel at a rate sufficient
to assure temporal coherence between channel estimates and
that, prior to Eve’s arrival, Bob has estimated the Alice-Bob
channel. Eve wishes to convince Bob that she is Alice. Bob
will require that each information-carrying transmission be
accompanied by an authenticator signal. The channel response
to a transmitted signal between Alice and Bob is a result of the
multipath environment. Bob may use the received version of
the authenticator signal to estimate the channel response and
compare this with a previous record for the Alice-Bob channel.
If the two channel estimates are “close” to each other, then
Bob will conclude that the source of the message is the same
as the source of the previously sent message. If the channel
estimates are not similar, then Bob should conclude that the
source is likely not Alice.
There are several important issues related to such a pro-
cedure that should be addressed before it can be a viable
authentication mechanism. First is the specification of the
authenticator signal that is used to probe the channel. There are
many standardized techniques to probe the channel, ranging
from pulse-style probing (including PN sequences) to multi-
tonal probing [18], and we may use these techniques to
estimate the channel response. Regardless of what probing
method is employed, the channel response can be characterized
in the frequency domain, and throughout this paper we will
represent our channels in that domain.
A second issue is that in a richly scattered multipath
environment (typical of indoor wireless environments), it is
difficult for an adversary to create or precisely model a wave-
form that is transmitted and received by entities that are more
3than a wavelength away from the adversary. This assertion is
supported by the well-known Jakes uniform scattering model
[19], which states that the received signal rapidly decorrelates
over a distance of roughly half a wavelength, and that spatial
separation of one to two wavelengths is sufficient for assuming
independent fading paths. The implication of such a scattering
model in a transmitter identification application remains to be
tested, and a key objective of this study is to examine the utility
of a typical indoor multipath environment for discriminating
between Alice-Bob and Eve-Bob channels.
Finally, it should also be noted that the channel response
may change with time due to changes in the environment (peo-
ple moving, doors opening or closing) and in practice it will
be necessary to guarantee the continuity of the authentication
procedure by probing the channel at time intervals less than the
channel’s “coherence time”. This paper examines the ability to
authenticate transmitters in such a time-variant environment,
and serves to illustrate the potential for new forms of physical
layer security.
IV. CHANNEL MODEL
A. Basic Form
We assume that Bob first measures and stores the frequency
response of the channel connecting Alice with him. Due to
his receiver thermal noise, Bob stores a noisy version of
the channel response, HA(f). After awhile, he has to decide
whether a transmitting terminal is still Alice, based on a noisy
measured version, Ht(f), of that terminal’s channel response
to Bob. By sampling HA(f) and Ht(f) at f ∈ (fo−W/2, fo+
W/2], Bob obtains two frequency response vectors, HA and
Ht, of length M , where W is the measurement bandwidth; fo
is the center frequency of the measurement; and the vector
elements are frequency response samples at M uniformly
spaced frequencies over the measurement bandwidth.
We consider a generalized time-variant channel response,
where each frequency response sample is made up of three
parts: the fixed part that is the average channel response
over time and contains the spatial variability information, the
variable part with zero mean, and the receiver noise. Thus the
m-th element of HA at time kT from some arbitrary time
origin can be written as
HA,m[k] = HA,m + ǫA,m[k] +NA,m[k], 1 ≤ m ≤M,
(1)
where we use the notation that Xm[k] is the sample from
X(t; f) at the m-th tone at a sampling time of kT . More
specifically, Xm[k] = X(kT ; fo − W/2 + m∆f), m =
1, · · · ,M , where ∆f = W/M ; M is the sample size in the
frequency domain; and T is the sampling interval. The term
HA,m is the average value of the m-th tone over time, ǫA,m[k]
is the zero-mean variable part at time kT , and NA,m[k]
represents thermal noise sample at the m-th tone at time
kT . The noises are modelled by CN(0, σ2N ), i.e., zero-mean
complex Gaussian samples with variance σ2N . Without loss
of realism, we can assume that they are independent across
time, tone (frequency) and terminal (space), and that ǫA,m[k]
is independent of NA,m[k].
B. Delay Profile and Doppler Spectrum (Temporal Fading) of
the Variable Part
We model the variable part of the channel response as wide-
sense stationary uncorrelated scattering (WSSUS), and can
thus use a multipath tapped delay line to model its impulse
response, h(t, τ) [20]:
h(t, τ) =
∞∑
l=0
Al(t)δ(t− l∆τ), (2)
where t is the observation time, and l∆τ and Al(t) are,
respectively, the delay and complex amplitude of the l-th
multipath component, with E[Al(t)] = 0 over time. We set
∆τ = 1/W , since the receiver cannot resolve two components
with time difference smaller than the inverse of the bandwidth.
The frequency response of the variable part is the Fourier
transform of h(t; τ) in terms of τ ,
ǫA,m[k] = F{h(t; τ)}|t=kT,f=fo−W/2+m∆f
=
∞∑
l=0
Al[k]e
−j2pi(fo−W/2+m∆f)l∆, (3)
where Al[k] = Al(kT ) is the amplitude sample of the
multipath component at time kT .
For illustrative purposes, we use the one-sided exponential
distribution to model the power delay spectrum of Al[k]1, i.e.,
Pτ [l] = Var[Al[k]] = σ2T (1− e−γ∆τ)e−γ∆τl, (4)
where γ = 2πBc is the inverse of the average delay spread,
Bc is the coherence bandwidth of the variable part, and σ2T is
the average power of Al[k] over all taps.
Also for illustrative purposes, we use an autoregressive
model of order 1 (AR-1) to characterize the temporal process
of Al[k], i.e.,
Al[k] = aAl[k − 1] +
√
(1− a2)Pτ [l]ul[k], (5)
where the AR coefficient a denotes the similarity of two
Al values spaced by T and the random component ul[k] ∼
CN(0, 1) is independent of Al[k − 1].
C. Spatial Correlations
As pointed out in Section I, in a typically rich scattering
environment, the radio channel response decorrelates quite
rapidly in space. Later, we will cite the use of the ray-tracing
software WiSE to emulate the spatial correlation characteris-
tics of the fixed part of the channel response (H). As to the
variable part, however, we consider the two extreme cases:
1) Spatially independent and identically distributed ǫ. The
frequency response sample of the channel between Eve and
Bob can be written as
HE,m[k] = HE,m + ǫE,m[k] +NE,m[k], (6)
1The literature abounds with empirical data [21] and theoretical examples
[22] in which the exponential delay profile appears. We invoke it here for the
sake of concreteness, which will allow us to compute numerical results, but
we also recognize it to be a realistic condition.
4where 1 ≤ m ≤ M , HE,m = E[HE,m[k]] is the time
average; thermal noise NE,m[k] ∼ CN(0, σ2N ); and ǫE,m[k]
and ǫA,m[k] are independent identically distributed (i.i.d.).
2) Complete spatially correlated variation (ǫE,m[k] =
ǫA,m[k]). Here, we have
HE,m[k] = HE,m + ǫA,m[k] +NE,m[k], 1 ≤ m ≤M.
(7)
D. Important Relationships
Two important relationships we will use in the hypothesis
testing later are as follows (proofs are provided in the Ap-
pendix):
Relationship 1:
HA[k]−HA[k − 1] ∼ CN(0,R), (8)
where
R = Cov[HA[k]−HA[k − 1]]
= [r(m− n)]mn, 1 ≤ m,n ≤M, (9)
r(0) = 2(1− a)σ2T + 2σ2N , and
r(m) =
2σ2T (1− a)(1 − e−2piBc/W )
1− e−2piBc/W−j2pim/M , 1−M ≤ m ≤M − 1.
(10)
Relationship 2: For the case with spatially independent time
variation,
HE [k]−HA[k − 1] ∼ CN((HE −HA),G), (11)
where
G = Cov[HE [k]−HA[k − 1]]
=


2σ2T + 2σ
2
N
r(−1)
1−a · · · r(1−M)1−a
r(1)
1−a 2σ
2
T + 2σ
2
N · · · r(2−M)1−a
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
r(M−1)
1−a
r(M−2)
1−a · · · 2σ2T + 2σ2N

 .
(12)
V. HYPOTHESIS TESTING
Here, we present formulas for hypothesis testing that will
be reduced later to numerical results.
A. General Case
As in [16], Bob uses a simple hypothesis test to decide if
the transmitting terminal is Alice or a would-be intruder, Eve.
The null hypothesis, H0, is that the terminal is not an intruder,
i.e. the claimant is Alice; and Bob accepts this hypothesis if
the test statistic he computes, Z , is below some threshold, T .
Otherwise, he accepts the alternative hypothesis, H1, that the
claimant terminal is someone else. Thus,
H0 : Ht[k] = HA[k] (13)
H1 : Ht[k] 6= HA[k], (14)
First, we assume spatially independent time variations and
assume Bob knows the key channel variation parameters a,
Bc and σT . (We will discuss other cases in the later parts of
this section.) We choose the test statistic in this default setting
as
Z = zHz = 2(Ht[k]− HA[k − 1])HR−1(Ht[k]−HA[k − 1]),
(15)
where z =
√
2(RHd )−1(Ht[k]− HA[k − 1]), R and Rd are the
covariance matrix of HA[k]−HA[k−1], (9), and its Cholesky
factorization (i.e., R=RHd Rd).
It can be shown that, when the transmitting terminal is Al-
ice, each element of z is i.i.d., following a normal distribution,
z =
√
2(RHd )−1(HA[k]−HA[k − 1]), where the elements are
i.i.d., and zi ∼ CN(0, 2), 1 ≤ i ≤M . Thus the test statistic Z
is a chi-square random variable with 2M degrees of freedom
[23], i.e., Z = zHz ∼ χ22M .
We define the rejection region for H0 as Z > T . Thus, the
“false alarm rate” (or Type I error) is α = Pr{Z > T |H0} =
1− Fχ2
2M
(T ); and the “miss rate” (or Type II error) is given
by (16), where FX(·) is the CDF of the random variable X
and F−1X (·) is the inverse function of FX(·). For a specified α,
the threshold of the test is T = F−1
χ2
2M
(1 − α), and the miss
rate can be obtained by numerical methods.
B. Asymptotic Results for Low Correlation Bandwidth
When the variation is independent over tones (i.e.,
Bc/W ≪ 1), the covariance matrices of Eq. (9) and (12)
become
R = Cov[HA[k]−HA[k − 1]] = (2(1− a)σ2T + 2σ2N )I
G = Cov[HE [k]− HA[k − 1]] = (2σ2T + 2σ2N )I, (17)
where I is the identity matrix. Thus the test statistic Eq. (15)
becomes
Z =
|Ht[k]−HA[k − 1]|2
(1− a)σ2T + σ2N
= Z2/ρ, (18)
where
ρ =
(1− a)σ2T + σ2N
σ2T + σ
2
N
. (19)
It is easy to see that, under H1, the test statistic is a
non-central chi-square distribution with order 2M , i.e., Z2 ∼
χ22M,µ with non-central parameter
µ =
∑M
m=1 |HE,m −HA,m|2
σ2T + σ
2
N
(20)
Thus, the miss rate for specified α, (16), can be written as
β = Pr{Z < T |H1} = Fχ2
2M,µ
(ρF−1
χ2
2M
(1− α)). (21)
C. Asymptotic Results for High Correlation Bandwidth
When the variation is totally correlated over tones (i.e.,
Bc/W ≫ 1), the covariance matrices of (9) and (12) degrade
to
R = 2σ2NI + 2(1− a)σ2T 1 (22)
G = 2σ2NI + 2σ2T 1, (23)
where 1 is a M ×M matrix with each element equals to 1.
Again, we can use Eq. (16) to numerically calculate the miss
rate β for specified false alarm rate α.
5β = Pr{Z < T |H1} = Pr{2(HE [k]−HA[k − 1])HR−1(HE,t[k]−HA[k − 1]) < F−1χ2
2M
(1− α)}, (16)
D. Unknown Parameters
When Bob does not know the parameters a, Bc and σT , it
is reasonable for him to use as the test statistic
Z =
1
σ2N
|Ht[k]−HA[k − 1]|2. (24)
In this case, we can obtain numerical results for the false alarm
rate and miss rate for specified threshold T , plotting β vs. α
with T as an implicit parameter.
E. Full Spatial Correlation
Now we consider the other extreme case of spatial corre-
lation, namely, ǫE,m[k] = ǫA,m[k] (full spatial correlation).
The spatial correlation has no impact under the hypothesis
H0. However, under the hypothesis H1, the correlation matrix
of the difference between two measurements becomes R, and
HE [k] − HA[k − 1] ∼ CN((HE − HA),R). Thus, the test
statistic under H1 is non-central chi-square distributed, Z =
|√2(RHd )−1(HE [k]−HA[k−1])|2 ∼ χ22M,µ, with non-central
parameter µ = |√2(RHd )−1(HE −HA)|2. Therefore, the miss
rate for the fully spatially correlated temporal variation can be
written as
β = Fχ2
2M,µ
(F−1
χ2
2M
(1− α)). (25)
F. Discussion: Impact of Time Variations
As a benchmark, from (21) we have the miss rate for the
time-invariant channel as [16],
β = Fχ2
2M,µ
(F−1
χ2
2M
(1− α)), (26)
where µ =
∑M
m=1 |HE,m −HA,m|2/σ2N .
In the presence of time variation, however, the miss rate
may become smaller. The asymptotic miss rate for the time-
variant channel at high bandwidth, (21), increases with ρ, (19),
and decreases with µ, (20). As the time variation σ2T rises
from 0 to ∞, ρ decreases from 1 to 1 − a and µ falls from∑M
m=1 |HE,m − HA,m|2/σ2N to 0, which may results in a
smaller miss rate.
Actually, the temporal-variation has a two-fold impact: 1)
It adds uncertainty to the channel from Alice, and thus Bob
has to increase the test threshold to accept Alice (negative
impact on the performance); 2) the variation is usually strongly
correlated in time while very weakly correlated in space, and
thus ǫA[k] − ǫA[k − 1] < ǫE [k] − ǫA[k − 1] (positive impact
on performance).
When σT is negligible, the channel can be viewed ap-
proximately as a time-invariant one, wherein the miss rate
is given by (26). As σT rises, the miss rate falls since the
positive impact dominates. If the variation continues to rise and
becomes very large, the miss rate begins to rise, as the need
to raise the threshold helps Eve and counteracts the positive
impact. When σT becomes so large that both the fixed part
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Fig. 2. System topology assumed in the simulations. Bob is located at 2-m
height near the center of a 120 m × 14 m × 4 m office building. Alice and
Eve are located on dense grids at a height of 2 m. The sizes of the grids are
Ns = 150, 713, 315, and 348, respectively, for Room # 1, 2, 3 and 4.
of the channel response and the thermal noise are relatively
negligible (i.e., σ2T ≫ σ2N , σ2T ≫
∑M
m=1 |HE,m −HA,m|2),
then using (21) we can rewrite the miss rate as
β ≈ Fχ2
2M
((1− a)F−1
χ2
2M
(1− α)), (27)
which is a function of the time-correlation of the temporal
variation parameter (a), frequency sample size (M ), and the
false alarm rate (α). If the variation is strongly correlated in
time (a ≈ 1), the miss rate can be less than that for the noise-
dominated case, (26), where the thermal noise is usually not
negligible due to the limited transmit power. An illustration of
this trend will be given later.
Finally, we consider the impact of the spatial correlation of
time variations. The miss rate with total spatial correlation,
(25), decreases with µ in a manner that is proportional to the
inverse of R, (9), and thus rises with σT . Since a strong spatial
correlation of the time variation damages the spatial variability
character of the channel, which is the basis of our scheme, it
will degrade the system performance.
VI. SIMULATION METHODOLOGY
A. Simulating the Transfer Functions
In order to test the proposed scheme, it is necessary to model
not only “typical” channel responses, but the spatial variability
of these responses. Only in this way can we discern the success
in detecting would-be intruders like Eve. To that end, we make
use of the WiSE Tool, a ray-tracing software package devel-
oped by Bell Laboratories [24]. One input to WiSE is the 3-
dimensional plan of a specific building, including walls, floors,
ceilings and their material properties. With this information,
WiSE can predict the rays at any receiver from any transmitter,
including their amplitudes, phases and delays. From this, it
is straightforward to construct the transmit-receive frequency
response over any specified frequency interval (bandwidth).
We have done this for one particular office building (the
Alcatel-Lucent Crawford Hill Laboratory in Holmdel, NJ), for
which a top view of the first floor is shown in Fig. 2. This
floor of this building is 120 meters long, 14 meters wide and
64 meters high. For our numerical experiment, we placed Bob
in the hallway (the filled-in circle) at a height of 3 m. For
the positions of Alice and Eve, we considered four rooms
at the extremities of the building (shown shaded). For each
room, we assumed Alice and Eve both transmitted from a
height of 2 m, each of them being anywhere on a uniform
horizontal grid of points with 0.2-meter separations. With Ns
grid points in a room, there were Ns(Ns−1)/2 possible pairs
of Alice-Eve positions. For Rooms 1, 2, 3 and 4, the numbers
of grid points were Ns = 150, 713, 315 and 348, respectively.
For each Alice-Eve pair, (1) WiSE was used to generate the
Alice-Bob and Eve-Bob average channel responses (HA(f)
and HE(f)); and (2) the hypothesis test described above was
used to compute β for a specified α. The set of all β-values in a
room were used to compute a room-specific mean, β, for each
of several selected combinations of bandwidth (W ), number
of frequency-domain samples (M ), transmit power (PT ), and
channel variation models.
B. Transmit Power, Receiver Noise, and Time Variation
Strength
Assume that, in conjunction with WiSE, we obtain the var-
ious transfer functions as dimensionless ratios (e.g., received
E-field/transmitted E-field). Then the proper treatment of the
noise variance, σ2N , in the hypothesis test is to define it as the
receiver noise power per tone, PN , divided by the transmit
power per tone, PT /M , where PT is the total transmit power.
Noting that PN = κT NF b, where κT is the thermal noise
density in mW/Hz, NF is the receiver noise figure, and b is
the measurement noise bandwidth per tone in Hz [18], we can
write
σ2N =
κT NF b
PT /M
=
M
Γ
, (28)
where PT is in mW, and Γ = PT /PN . We will henceforth
refer to Γ by its decibel value.
Let b2T denote the ratio between σ2T and the value of |H |2
averaged over the M frequency samples (or “tones”) and the
Ns receiver locations. We can thus write the standard deviation
of the time variation as
σT = bTH = bT
√√√√ 1
MNs
M∑
m=1
Ns∑
l=1
|Hl,m|2, (29)
where H can be regarded as a room parameter, and bT
represents the relative magnitude of the time variation in a
given room.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In our simulations, we set f0 = 5 GHz, NF = 10 (10
dB noise figure), κT = 10−17.4 mW/Hz, b = 0.25 MHz,
a = 0.9, and, unless specified otherwise, α = 0.01 [25]. As
noted earlier, we place Alice and Eve on dense grids in each
of four rooms at the corners of a particular building, with Bob
in the hallway, Fig. 2. We obtained a miss rate for each Alice-
Eve pair in each room, and then calculated the average mean
value for each room in the building. Among them, Room # 4,
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Fig. 3. The average miss rate as function of the relative standard deviation
of the time variation, for the channel with spatially independent temporal
variation. M = 10, W = 10 MHz, a = 0.9 and Bc = 0.
as the farthest room from Bob, is likely to have the poorest
performance in rejecting Eve. In that sense, it lower-bounds
the capabilities of our PHY-layer authentication algorithm. For
reasons of space, we will only present results for Room # 4,
keeping in mind that they are essentially worst-case or close
to it.
Figure 3 confirms the efficacy of the algorithm in the
presence of channel time variations. We assume realistic
system parameter values (PT = 1 mW ∼ 1 W, M = 10
and W = 10 MHz), and find that most average miss rates are
smaller than 0.01. The per tone signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in
the channel measurements ranges from -12.8 dB to 14.2 dB,
with a media value of 6.4 dB, if using PT = 10 mW, M = 10
and W = 10 MHz. Also, as pointed out in Section V, our
proposed algorithm can exploit the time variations to improve
performance. For example, the miss rate falls from around
0.01 to 10−5 when bT rises from 0.01 to 1, with PT = 100
mW. The trend of these curves with time variation confirms the
discussion in Section V-F, e.g., the minimum average miss rate
is a tradeoff between the positive impact of the time variation
and its negative impact resulting from the rise of the threshold.
Moreover, the miss rate falls with the transmit power PT ,
as expected, since it reduces the measurement noise at the
receiver.
Figure 4 demonstrates the impact of the bandwidth W and
the coherence bandwidth Bc. We note that the results for Bc =
0 and Bc =∞ are the lower and upper bounds, respectively,
of the miss rates, as well as the asymptotic results for the
high- and low-bandwidth regions. It is clear that frequency
correlations degrade performance. A related finding is that the
miss rate decreases with increasing bandwidth, W , since the
frequency response samples are more independent with larger
W .
Figure 5 indicates that there is little benefit (or even a
deficit) in increasing M beyond ∼ 10, unless the frequency
correlation is very small (e.g., Bc = 0) with high transmit
power. Actually, the optimal sample size M in terms of
710−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Bandwidth (GHz)
A
ve
ra
ge
 M
iss
 R
at
e
 
 
Bc=0
Bc=1 MHz
Bc=2 MHz
Bc=4 MHz
Bc=∞
Fig. 4. The average miss rate as a function of the measurement bandwith
W , for the channel with spatially independent temporal variation. M = 5,
a = 0.9, bT = 0.5, and PT = 10 mW.
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Fig. 5. The average miss rate as a function of the number of frequency
samples, for the channel with spatially independent temporal variation. W =
10 MHz, a = 0.9, bT = 0.5, and PT = 10 mW.
miss rate for specified measurement bandwidth decreases with
the coherence bandwidth Bc, because the noise power (28)
rises with M and the frequency-response samples are more
correlated with larger Bc.
We see in Fig. 6 that the algorithm works even when Bob
does not know the key channel parameters, although it requires
either more transmit power or greater tolerance for Type II
errors. Interestingly, the time-variation may still help here, e.g.,
the miss rate falls as bT rises from 0.1 to 1. How to set the
test threshold T in this case is an open topic.
Finally, Fig. 7 shows that the system is very sensitive to the
time-variation in an extreme case of full spatial correlation. It
requires much more transmit power (PT ∼ 0.5W) to reach the
same miss rate performance. The reason is quite simple: the
mechanism of our scheme is to utilize the spatial variability
of the channel responses. The spatial correlation of the time
variation decreases the overall spatial variability and thus
degrades the performance.
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Fig. 6. Average miss rate vs. average false alarm rate when Bob does
not know the channel parameters, for the channel with spatially independent
temporal variation. W = 50 MHz, M = 10, a = 0.9, and Bc = 2 MHz.
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correlated temporal variation. W = 100 MHz, Bc = 2 MHz, PT = 0.5 W,
and a = 0.9.
The above assertions apply as well to the other shaded
rooms in Fig. 2 and, we can safely assume, to the other rooms
in the building.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have described and studied a physical layer technique
for enhancing authentication in a time-variant wireless en-
vironment. Specifically, we assume the user terminals are
stationary but changes in the environment produce additive
time-varying changes in the channel responses. The technique
uses channel frequency response measurements and hypothesis
testing to discriminate between a legitimate user (Alice) and
a would-be intruder (Eve). With the ability to utilize the
temporal-variation, it works even when the receiver does
not know the key channel variation parameters, namely, the
AR temporal coefficient a, the coherence bandwidth Bc and
the standard deviation of the variation σT , although these
parameters help reduce the miss rate if known.
8The algorithm has been verified in a typical in-building
environments, where we used the ray-tracing tool WiSE
to generate realistic average channel responses and used a
multipath tapped delay line channel model for the temporal
variation part of the channel response. Simulation results have
confirmed the efficacy of the algorithm for realistic values of
the measurement bandwidth (e.g., W ∼ 10 MHz), number of
response samples (e.g., M ≤ 10) and transmit power (e.g.,
PT > 10 mW). The miss rate is generally smaller than 0.01,
for a specified false alarm rate of 0.01, in the presence of
moderate channel time variations.
We have found that the channel time variations can improve
the performance, e.g., the miss rate falls from around 0.01 to
10−5 when the variation index bT rises from 0.01 to 1, with
PT = 100 mW. In addition, the miss rate decreases with the
transmit power of the probing signal and the measurement
bandwidth, and usually requires frequency samples of fewer
than 10. We have also shown that the time correlation of the
channel variation is helpful, while coherence in the frequency
and spatial domains are harmful.
Research is currently in progress to address the case of user
terminal mobility. Effort is also needed, for the stationary case,
to explore the parameter space (e.g., the temporal coherence
term a); devise means of setting the test threshold T ; consider
other buildings; and conduct experiments to more accurately
characterize the time-variation properties of indoor channels.
Moreover, we are working to integrate physical layer au-
thentication into a holistic cross-layer framework for wireless
security that will augment traditional “higher-layer” network
security mechanisms with physical layer methods.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF RELATIONSHIP 1
Since Al[k] ∼ CN(0, Pτ [l]), from Eq. (3) and (4), we have
E[ǫA,m[k]] =
∞∑
l=0
E[Al[k]e
−j2pi(fo−W/2+m∆f)l∆] = 0 (30)
and
Var[ǫA,m[k]] =
∞∑
l=0
Var[Al[k]e−j2pi(fo−W/2+m∆f)l∆]
=
∞∑
l=0
Var[Al[k]]
=
∞∑
l=0
σ2T (1− e−γ∆τ)e−γ∆τl = σ2T (31)
Here we also utilize the fact that any two different multipath
components in a WSSUS channel are uncorrelated, i.e., ∀l1 6=
l2, ∀k1, k2,
E[Al1 [k1]Al2 [k2]] = 0 (32)
Considering that Al[k − 1] and ul[k] are both zero-mean
and independent to each other, we see from Eq. (4) and (5)
that
E[Al[k1]Al[k2]] = a
|k1−k2|Var[Al[min(k1, k2)]]
= a|k1−k2|σ2T (1− e−γ∆τ)e−γ∆τ (33)
Then from (3), (32), and (33), we have
E[ǫA,m[k1]ǫA,n[k2]
∗]
=
∞∑
l1=0
∞∑
l2=0
E[Al1 [k1]Al2 [k2]]
· e−j2pi[(fo−W/2+m∆f)l1−(fo−W/2+n∆f)l2]/W
=
∞∑
l=0
E[Al[k1]Al[k2]]e
j2pi(n−m)∆fl/W
=
∞∑
l=0
a|k1−k2|σ2T (1− e−γ∆τ)e−γ∆τlej2pi(n−m)∆fl/W
=
a|k1−k2|σ2T (1− e−γ∆τ)
1− e−γ∆τ+j2pi(n−m)∆fl∆τ (34)
By (1), (31), and (34), we get
Var[HA,m[k]−HA,m[k − 1]]
= Var[ǫA,m[k]− ǫA,m[k − 1] +NA,m[k]−NA,m[k − 1]]
= Var[ǫA,m[k]] + Var[ǫA,m[k − 1]]
− 2Cov[ǫA,m[k], ǫA,m[k − 1]] + Var[NA,m[k]]
+ Var[NA,m[k − 1]]
= 2σ2T − 2E[ǫA,m[k]ǫ∗A,m[k − 1]] + 2σ2N
= 2σ2T (1− a) + 2σ2N (35)
The thermal noise components are independent of each other
and all the other variables, and the fixed part of the channel
can be viewed as constant, so ∀m 6= n
r(m − n)
= Cov[HA,m[k]−HA,m[k − 1], HA,n[k]−HA,n[k − 1]]
= Cov[ǫA,m[k]− ǫA,m[k − 1], ǫA,n[k]− ǫA,n[k − 1]]
= E[ǫA,m[k]ǫ
∗
A,n[k]] +E[ǫA,m[k − 1]ǫ∗A,n[k − 1]]
− E[ǫA,m[k]ǫ∗A,n[k − 1]]− E[ǫA,m[k − 1]ǫ∗A,n[k]]
=
2σ2T (1− a)(1 − e−γ∆τ)
1− e−γ∆τ+j2pi(n−m)∆τ∆f
=
2σ2T (1− a)(1− e−2piBc/W )
1− e−2piBc/W+j2pi(n−m)/M (36)
It can be easily proved that HA[k] − HA[k − 1] has zero
mean and is a Gaussian random variable, since it is the linear
combination of Gaussian random variables.
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF RELATIONSHIP 2
For the case with spatially independent time variation where
ǫE,m[k] and ǫA,m[k] are independent identically distributed,
from (1) and (6) we have
Var[HE,m[k]−HA,m[k − 1]]
= Var[ǫE,m[k]− ǫA,m[k − 1] +NE,m[k]−NA,m[k − 1]]
= Var[ǫE,m[k]] + Var[ǫA,m[k − 1]]
+ Var[NA,m[k]] + Var[NE,m[k]]
= 2σ2T + 2σ
2
N (37)
9And ∀m 6= n,
Cov[HE,m[k]−HA,m[k − 1], HE,n[k]−HA,n[k − 1]]
= Cov[ǫE,m[k]− ǫA,m[k − 1], ǫE,n[k]− ǫA,n[k − 1]]
= E[ǫE,m[k]ǫ
∗
E,n[k]] +E[ǫA,m[k − 1]ǫ∗A,n[k − 1]]
=
2σ2T (1− e−γ∆τ)
1− e−γ∆τ+j2pi(n−m)∆τ∆f = r(m − n)/(1− a) (38)
From (1) and (6) we also see that E[HE [k] − HA[k − 1]] =
HE −HA. The other part is similar to that of Relationship 1.
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